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"International economists," Jagdish Bhagwati writes, "have long been
frustrated by the dissonance between the elegance of their irrefutable
demonstration of the advantages of free trade and the inelegance with
which practical politics embraces protection."' International trade law-
yers, for their part, frequently have been frustrated by the apparent ivory
tower impracticality of many of those same international economists. To
those in the arena opposing protection, the arguments of some econo-
mists can appear so dismissive of the very real human concerns of those
who seek protection as to be irrelevant at best and counterproductive at
worst.
Although he is able to demonstrate both elegantly and irrefutably the
advantages of free trade, Professor Bhagwati is not one of those impracti-
cal economists. To the contrary, in this publication of his 1987 inaugural
Ohlin Lectures, given at the Stockholm School of Economics, Professor
Bhagwati provides not only an intellectually elegant discussion of free
trade and protectionism, but also a sophisticated appreciation of today's
inelegant protectionist reality. Paul Samuelson, in a jacket blurb, terms
Professor Bhagwati's Protectionism a "tour de force," and so it is.
The conversational tone of the six chapters of this small volume re-
flects their lecture origin. If Professor Bhagwati speaks as he writes, then
he speaks with much grace and wit. The volume has been beefed-up with
a dozen-page bibliography, several illustrative charts and graphs,
cartoons from Punch, and a photograph - for those who have never
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seen their troglodytic visages - of those two stalwarts of America trade
policy, Sen. Reed Smoot and Rep. Willis Hawley.
Professor Bhagwati first sets the scene with a description of the post-
World War II era of trade liberalization, and then leads the reader
through a discussion of the ideology, the interests and the institutions
which supported that liberalization. He recounts the delegation of trade
policy from the U.S. Congress - stung by Smoot-Hawley - to the exec-
utive branch, which is both less subject to protectionist pressures and
institutionally more biased toward an open trading system. He takes the
reader through an insightful discussion of the intellectual case for free
trade, and attributes the remarkable support of the United States for the
post-World War II liberal trade regime not only to the perceived eco-
nomic benefits, but also to the belief that U.S. security interests were
served best by such policies.
2
But this is only a crisp, fresh retelling of a well-known tale. What will
strike international trade lawyers as the book's most insightful chapter is
the one dealing with the rise of protectionism in the 1970s and 1980s.
Here, very originally and very aptly, Professor Bhagwati discusses the
"capture" of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws by the forces
of protectionism. The "capture" of these laws is perhaps the most im-
portant development in trade policy in the past two decades, and Profes-
sor Bhagwati is one of the few economists who knows this and is worried
about it.
He makes a persuasive case that any free trade regime, in order to
survive, needs a means of preventing distortive practices. It is difficult
enough, he points out, for governments to cope with the demise of their
industries in pursuit of the economic gains of free trade when another
country has only a market-determined advantage; it can be impossible
when that advantage is derived not from the market, but from artificial
government support.3 Thus he is not in sympathy with the traditional
argument that government subsidies of exports are beneficial because the
importing country gets the product more cheaply. Professor Bhagwati
refutes this argument with a trenchant rhetorical question: "Would one
be wise to receive stolen property simply because it is cheaper, or would
one rather vote to prohibit such transactions because of their systemic
consequences?' 4 For its own good, he concludes, the world trading or-
2. Id. at 38.
3. Id. at 34.
4. Id. at 35.
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der must permit "the appropriate use of countervailing duties and an-
tidumping actions to maintain fair, competitive trade." 5
But this is the ideal. The reality is that, however legitimate their roles
in a free trade regime, these laws have been captured and misused by the
forces of protectionism. This is particularly true in the United States of
the antidumping law.
I
The U.S. antidumping law provides for the imposition of a special duty
to offset the margin of any "dumping" of imported merchandise. 6 This is
the amount by which the price of merchandise sold for export to the
United States is less than its "fair" value, which normally is the price for
comparable merchandise in the country of export.7 International price
discrimination, then, is the gravamen of dumping. Those familiar with
the domestic price discrimination statute, the Robinson-Patman Act,8
may assume that the antidumping law is similar. They would be mis-
taken. The antidumping law shares with Robinson-Patman the dubious
premise that differential pricing is undesirable, but beyond that the laws
differ greatly.9
Professor Bhagwati uses the term "asymmetries" to characterize the
differences in the standards that determine what is unfair price discrimi-
nation for foreign firms and what is unfair price discrimination for do-
mestic firms. 10 He does not, however, describe these asymmetries in
detail. An exploratory excursion into some of the asymmetries that Pro-
fessor Bhagwati might have elaborated upon shows that his characteriza-
tion is more than justified.
First, the very methodology for determining the existence of price dis-
crimination under the antidumping law is unfair, and is a major element
in the protectionist capture of this law. The normal procedure of the
Department of Commerce, whose International Trade Administration
makes the determination, is to investigate the exporter's prices for sales
in its home market and in the United States for a recent period, usually
5. Id.
6. The antidumping law is set forth in Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19
U.S.C. §§ 1673-1677h (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
7. Id. § 1677b(a).
8. The Robinson-Patman Act was a 1936 amendment to Section 2 of the Clayton Act.
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982).
9. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTiCE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT
(1977), especially Ch. IV.
10. BHAGWATI, at 51.
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six months.11 A weighted-average price is calculated for the home mar-
ket for the period, and then the price of each individual sale to the
United States is compared to this average. 12 Almost inevitably a finding
of dumping results because an average of different numbers necessarily
will exceed some of its components. For example, if on the same day a
foreign firm sold identical quantities of merchandise in the United States
and in its home market for $100 a unit, and some days later it sold identi-
cal quantities in both markets for $200 a unit, the average home market
price - $150 - would be termed "fair value." Each sale to the United
States then would be compared to this "fair value," and the first - at
$100 - would be found to be "less than fair value." No allowance
would be made for the fact that the $200 sale exceeds "fair value" by
exactly the same amount. 13 This exporter, under U.S. antidumping prac-
tice, has a dumping margin of fifty percent on fifty percent of its sales.
No comparable exercise is undertaken, and no violation would be found,
in a domestic price discrimination case.1
4
Another asymmetry between the antidumping law and domestic anti-
trust law concerns sales below cost. In an antitrust context, the issue is
raised when predatory pricing practices are under consideration; the rele-
vant question is whether sales have been below variable costs. 15 An-
tidumping law, however, is not concerned with predatory intent; its
absence is no defense, and the standard used is total cost, not variable
costs.16
Here is how it works: an antidumping investigation utilizes the cost of
producing the merchandise sold in the exporter's home market, not the
11. 19 C.F.R. § 353.20(a) (1988). See, e.g., Final Determination of Sales at Less Than
Fair Value: Brass Sheet and Strip From the Netherlands, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,431 (1988) (period
of investigation Feb. 1, 1987 through July 31, 1987).
12. This procedure is not readily apparent from the published text of most antidumping
determinations. The issue is discussed, however, in the few cases in which a departure was
made or urged. See, e.g., Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables From Mexico; Antidumping: Final
Determination of Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value, 45 Fed. Reg. 20,512 (1980) (average
daily prices compared); Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Fall-Harvested
Round White Potatoes From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,669 (1983) (each saleto U.S. compared
to weighted average foreign value for the day on which it occurred); Red Raspberries From
Canada; Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 50 Fed. Reg. 19,768 (1985)
(each separate sale to U.S. compared to 12-month weighted average foreign value), aff'd,
Washington Red Raspberry Comm'n v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 537 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
13. See Antidumping and Countervailing Duties; De Minimis Dumping Margins and De
Minimis Subsidies, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,660, 30,662 (1987); Certain Iron Construction Castings
From India; Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 51 Fed. Reg. 9486, 9489
(1986).
14. The Robinson-Patman Act instead compares at least two contemporaneous sales. See
4 VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 24.03 (1988).
15. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW §§ 710-722 (1978).
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b).
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cost of producing the merchandise sold in the United States. 17 The cost
question is crucial when the price in the United States - even when
measured by the unfair standards of the antidumping law - is higher
than the home market price. If those home market sales are determined
to be below their total cost, they are disregarded for purposes of the fair
value comparison.18 By employing the total cost concept, the antidump-
ing law not only denies the exporter the favorable comparison to its
lower priced home market sales, it also compels use of "constructed
value" 19 - a statutory formula which adds to the exporter's materials
and fabrication costs a required minimum of ten percent for overhead
and eight percent for profit.20 If overhead in fact is below ten percent,
the exporter will be deprived of this benefit when constructed value is
calculated, and if the company is earning less than an eight percent
profit, the exporter will be found to be dumping.
Still another example of the unfairness of the way in which price dis-
crimination is calculated under the antidumping law is the "ESP cap."
This concerns adjustments that are made to home market and export
prices to ensure that they are compared at a proper level, that the com-
parison is one of "apples to apples." For example, if a firm sells for cash
in one market while extending credit in another, the cost of extending the
credit will be taken into account in determining whether the net price to
the credit customer is higher or lower than the price to the cash
customer.2
1
The question of the "ESP cap" arises when the export sales are made
through a wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary, whose prices are termed the
"exporter's sales price" or "ESP. ' ' 22 That subsidiary incurs overhead ex-
penses that usually will differ from those incurred by the seller in its
home market. In order to ensure an "apples to apples" comparison, an
appropriate adjustment to the price of the goods should be made for the
overhead charges attributable to each market. Fair enough, but that is
not what occurs. Instead, all of the overhead charges incurred in the
United States are deducted when net U.S. price is calculated, but the
deduction in the home market is "capped" by the amount of the U.S.
deduction. In other words, if overhead is greater in the United States
than in the home market, all overhead in each market will be deducted;
but if the reverse is true, if home market overhead exceeds U.S. overhead,
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 1677b(a)(2).
20. Id. § 1677b(e)(1)(B)
21. 19 C.F.R. § 353.15 (1988).
22. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c) (1982).
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the home market deduction will be limited to the amount of expenses
incurred in the United States. 23 This is an "apples to oranges" compari-
son, without a counterpart in the law applicable to domestic firms; it
reflects yet another way in which the antidumping law has been captured
by "the forces of protection.
There are other asymmetries: Robinson-Patman requires injury to
competition;24 the antidumping law only requires injury to competitors
25
- which actually may enhance competition. Robinson-Patman permits
the defenses of meeting competition and cost justification;26 the an-
tidumping law does not.
27
As further evidence of his claim that the trade laws have been cap-
tured, Professor Bhagwati notes that the merits of an unfair trade peti-
tion are judged by officials of the petitioner's own government;28 that
economically meaningless measures of fair value often .are used;29 and
that affirmative determinations are based upon minuscule margins of
dumping.30 Each of these points is significant.
Perhaps removal of the power of decision in trade cases from the gov-
ernment of the petitioner will have to await developments in interna-
tional dispute settlement procedures that do not appear at all
imminent.3 1 This does not mean, however, that there is no room for
considerable improvement in the current procedures. There most cer-
tainly is. Under the present U.S. system, the same officials in the Depart-
ment of Commerce who have the responsibility for investigating the
petition's allegations, and for building the administrative record, also
23. 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) ("In making comparisons using exporter's sales price, reason-
able allowance will be made for all actual selling expenses incurred in the home market up to
the amount of the selling expenses incurred in the United States market.") (emphasis added).
This was upheld as "a fair and reasonable exercise of administrative authority" in Consumer
Prod. Div., SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed America, 753 F.2d 1033, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
25. The injury question in an antidumping investigation is simply whether
(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded,
by reason of imports sold at less than fair value. 19 U.S.C. § 1673. An "industry" consists of
the "domestic producers" of the relevant product, i.e., competitors. Id. § 1677(4).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
27. See supra note 25. The law mentions no specific defenses.
28. BHAGWATI, at 48-49.
29. BHAGWATI, at 51.
30. BHAGWATi, at 52.
31. The establishment of a bilateral panel to review antidumping and countervailing duty
determinations in the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement is, if not a small step, at
least a nod in this direction. Free Trade Agreement Canada-United States, Dec. 23, 1987, ch.
19, arts. 1901-11, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
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make the final determination. 32 Far more fair than this inquisitorial sys-
tem would be adoption of the standard American administrative law
model in which the investigative function within the agency is separated
from the adjudicative function.
33
As an example of an economically meaningless determination of fair
value, Professor Bhagwati cites the famous - or infamous - case of
Polish golf cars.34 This case presented the problem of how to measure
"fair value" in Poland, a country with a centrally-planned economy
where no golf cars were sold for home consumption. Professor Bhagwati
notes that "there is no way in which 'true' or 'fair' costs and prices can be
meaningfully determined for centrally planned economies in the first
place." 3
5
Because there is no meaningful home market price for purposes of an
antidumping comparison, the alternatives are either to exclude non-mar-
ket economies from the strictures of the law, or to invent a measure of
fair value. The first choice would be politically intolerable, so the second
is followed. An economically meaningless "surrogate" country method-
ology was invented for non-market economy countries such as Poland.
36
The result is that exporters in non-market economies are held to a mea-
sure of fairness - prices in a surrogate third country - which neither
they, nor anyone else, is able to ascertain before the fact. This ispost hoc
justice at its worst, the trade policy equivalent of charging a driver with
speeding on a road with no posted limits, based upon the limits posted on
some other road - a road that will be chosen only after the driver has
been stopped. It is difficult to dispute Professor Bhagwati's observation
that for these cases "the only outcome can be a political one" 37 for it is
only because of political considerations that these cases are processed
under the antidumping law at all. For any particular case, "political"
probably is not the right word to describe the results. "Arbitrary" best
describes what emerges from the economically meaningless exercise that
is undertaken.
32. For a criticism of this system, and a proposal for reform, see Palmeter, Torquemada
and the Tariff Act: The Inquisitor Rides Again, 20 INT'L LAW. 641 (1986).
33. See id.
34. BHAGWATI, at 51 (citing Electric Golf Cars from Poland; Antidumping, 40 Fed. Reg.
25,497 (1975)).
35. Id.
36. For a discussion of the non-market economy problem generally, see Corr, The NME
Import Regulation Dilemma: Two Proposals for a New Regulatory Approach, 12 N.C.J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 59 (1987); Patterson, Improving GATTRulesforNonmarket Economies, 20 J.
WORLD TRADE L., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 185; Horlick & Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade
and U.S. Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Laws, 18 INT'L LAW. 807 (1984).
37. BHAGWATI, at 51.
188
Vol. 14:182, 1989
The Capture of the Antidumping Law
As further evidence of the protectionist capture of- the antidumping
law, Professor Bhagwati notes that even minuscule margins have been
held to justify affirmative determinations of dumping.38 This point, while
not obvious, is telling. The regulations of the Department of Commerce
provide that any dumping margin greater than one-half of one percent
will justify an affirmative determination.3 9 Such a small amount may not
seem onerous; after all, an additional tariff of one-half of one percent
does not remind many people of Smoot-Hawley. This reasonable conclu-
sion is erroneous, however, for the scheme of the antidumping law puts
an importer of goods subject even to apparently low margins at consider-
able risk of much higher duties - duties that in theory have no upper
limit.
The key to this somewhat obscure point is that an announced dumping
margin represents only an estimated duty, not a finally determined one.
If Commerce finds sales at less than fair value, it does so, of course, based
only upon the sales examined during its six month investigation period.4°
By the time this determination is made, approximately five to eight
months will have passed since the close of that investigation period.41
Consequently, the determination is simply a finding that sales below "fair
value" occurred during the earlier investigation period; it has nothing
necessarily to do with what may have occurred later, or with what may
occur in the future. Subsequent changes in prices or adjustments may
change the margins on later sales considerably.42 The importer's pay-
ment of estimated dumping duties on these later sales is much like the
payment of estimated taxes by a taxpayer. Both are estimates only - the
final assessment is made, and the final bill is'rendered, only after the
relevant period closes.
The uncertainties connected with this system can have a substantial
chilling effect on trade. While the exporter would seem to have the op-
portunity to change its pricing practices in order to avoid future determi-
nations of dumping, this is not always easy, particularly since the
38. Id. at 52.
39. 19 C.F.R. § 353.24 (1988).
40. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
41. In a normal case, Commerce is required to reach a preliminary determination within
160 days of the filing of a petition, 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(1), and a final determination within 75
days of the rendering of the preliminary finding. Id. § 1673d(a).
42. The statute provides for annual administrative reviews of outstanding antidumping
duty orders. Id. § 1675(a)(1). During these reviews, the actual dumping margins for the re-
view period are determined, and the weighted average margin for this new period becomes the
estimated antidumping duty deposit rate for the next period. Regulations governing this com-
plex administrative procedure are set out at 19 C.F.R. § 353.53a (1988). Ordinarily, a firm
may request revocation of an antidumping order only after two consecutive years of no salesat
less than fair value. Id. § 353.54.
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Department of Commerce is permitted to change its methodology from
one investigation or review to another, and does so.4 3 Moreover, while it
is the foreign seller's home market and export prices that determine
whether dumping is occurring, it is the importer who pays the duty, and
the importer is essentially powerless even to know - much less to affect
- either the home market prices of the exporter or the costs on which
adjustments to prices will be based. Thus, any company which imports
merchandise from an exporter subject to a dumping order is acquiring an
open-ended contingent liability. Any company which assumes that a
small estimated dumping duty deposit is the outer measure of its poten-
tial exposure under the law may be disastrously mistaken. Even a minus-
cule dumping margin can put an entire import trade at enormous risk.
This is why petitioners fight so vigorously for affirmative determinations,
no matter how small the margin, and why determinations based on small
margins are further evidence of the capture of the antidumping law by
protectionist interests.44
Professor Bhagwati's criticism of the "fair" and "unfair" terminology
of the antidumping law as inherently vague45 is correct, but falls short of
the point. The terminology is more than vague; it is inherently pejora-
tive. Its connotation of moral deficiency sets the tone and characterizes
the nature of any discussion of the subject.46 In common law terms, dif-
ferential pricing is merely malum prohibitum - an act that is wrong
43. See, eg., Barium Chloride From the People's Republic of China; Final Results of An-
tidumping Administrative Review, 52 Fed. Reg. 313 (1987) ("Neither the law nor the Com-
merce Regulations compel us to use precisely the same method of determining foreign market
value as that used in the original investigation or a previous administrative review."). The
practice has been sustained on review. Uddeholm Corp. v. United States, 676 F. Supp. 1234
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (allowing Commerce to change its methods and requirements when
seeking data relevant to dumping margins so long as it acts reasonably and in accordance with
law).
44. As long ago as 1971, the Treasury Department, which at the time administered the
antidumping law, seemed almost to crow about the uncertainty created by the process. Even if
an exporter claims to an importer that steps have been taken to eliminate dumping, Treasury
said:
so long as the dumping finding remains outstanding, the importer can never be sure that
this is true. Even if the exporter is not stating a falsehood, he may have erred in his
calculations. Moreover in a fast changing market, it is conceivable that an exporter may
not be entirely certain that he has, in fact eliminated his dumping margins in the case of
all his sales. Given these circumstances, an American importer, if he has a choice, would
prefer to dehl with a supplier against whom no dumping finding is outstanding. Only then
can he be absolutely sure that he will not have to pay dumping duties.
Department of the Treasury, Antidumping Duties, in UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY AND PUBLISHED IN CONJUNCTION
WITH THE COMMISSION'S REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 395 (1971).
45. BHAGWATI, at 50.
46. See Palmeter, The Antidumping Emperor, 22 J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1988, at 5.
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only because it is prohibited by law, such as driving on the left side of
most highways in the United States, or on the right side of most high-
ways in the United Kingdom or Japan. But the terminology is that of
malum in se - an act which is inherently and essentially immoral, such
as theft or murder. One does not have to look long in the legislative
history or in judicial interpretations of the antidumping law to discern
this approach. A Senate committee has called dumping "pernicious." 47
One court has called it "predatory. ' 48 Others have used such terms as
"unfair imports" 49 and "unfair trade practices."' 50 This, to put it mildly,
is rather harsh language to describe conduct that may be perfectly legal
and perfectly fair when engaged in by a domestic firm.
A "fair" interpretation of this terminology is that it is inflammatory.
To be fair is to play by the rules; to be unfair is to engage in dishonorable,
dishonest, or unethical conduct. An exporter found to be dumping
stands condemned by a public which hears only the emotion-laden, pejo-
rative terms: "pernicious," "predatory," "dumping," "unfair." It is
rarely made clear, and very few seem to appreciate, that a double stan-
dard really is at work, that there exists an enormous asymmetry between
the legal standards of unfairness that are applied to foreign firms and
those that are applied to domestic firms. Professor Bhagwati is one of
the few who do appreciate this. He is one of the few who know that
under the trade laws of the United States, what's sauce for the foreign
goose is not sauce for the domestic gander.
The ease with which policy makers and the public seem to accept the
characterization of legitimate trading practices as "unfair" extends to the
export side of the trade equation as well. What Professor Bhagwati de-
scribes as the "insidious growth of the 'fairness' issue" applies to efforts
to open allegedly closed foreign markets by retaliation if satisfaction is
not obtained. 51 While many would not view this effort as protectionist,
Professor Bhagwati disagrees. Once again, he points out, it is the United
States that decides - unilaterally - if foreign markets are unfairly
closed to its exports; this may mean that weaker countries will concede
with resentment, while stronger countries will threaten a trade war by
making unilateral judgments of their own.52 Nor is this kind of market-
47. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 37 (1980).
48. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. United States, 823 F.2d 505, 509 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
49. Bingham & Taylor Div., Va. Industries, Inc. v. United States, 815 F.2d 1482, 1485
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
50. Bingham & Taylor, Div. Va. Industries, Inc. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 793, 798
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1986), aff'd, 815 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
51. BHAGWATI, at 123.
52. BHAGWATI, at 124.
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opening always tride-expanding, he notes; weaker countries, forced to
give in to the demands of the United States, in many cases simply will
divert their purchases to the United States and away from economically
more efficient, but politically less powerful, suppliers. 53 Finally, he con-
tends that the nature of these unilateral, market-opening confrontations
is sector-specific, and that this often can lead to harsh confrontations
over the details of trade in specific sectors; they also can lead to greater
sector-by-sector trade controls, pushing the world toward a mercantilist
system that is likely to benefit very few.5
4
The insidious use of the term "fairness," both to characterize the legiti-
mate trading practices of foreign exporters, and to provide an excuse for
many of the market failures of would-be U.S. exporters, leads some to
blame foreigners for most of our economic problems. It is far easier, and
much more pleasant in the short term, to indulge a sense of righteous-
ness, to feel the victim in a binge of nationalistic finger-pointing. It is
also far easier to accuse foreigners of being unfair than to acknowledge
that some of the more successful among them simply study longer, work
harder, and save more than we do.
55
The double standard that exists in the treatment of foreigners under
the antidumping law, as compared to the treatment of domestic firms
engaged in comparable behavior, is so great that it obscures problems
with the other major trade law, the countervailing duty law. This law
provides for duties to offset or "countervail" foreign subsidies.5 6 Profes-
sor Bhagwati argues that this law, like the antidumping law, has been
captured by protectionism 7
At first glance this may not be readily apparent. What, after all, is
protectionist about offsetting subsidies? Why should private firms, and
their employees, have to compete with companies backed by the re-
sources of government treasuries? First glances, however, do not consti-
tute analysis. The issue of subsidies is far more complicated.
53. BHAGWATI, at 124-25.
54. BHAGWATI, at 125.
55. While the typical U.S. school year is 180 days, Japan's is 240 and Korea's is 250 days.
Frederick, United Press International Wire Service, July 4, 1988 (Nexis Gen. File). The stan-
dard U.S. 40 hour work week is exceeded both by Japan's 48 hours and by Korea's 54 hours.
Bernstein, Labor: Japan's Rengo a Model for Unity, Strength, L.A. Times, Apr. 5, 1988, at 1,
pt. IV, col. 1; Kraar, Korea: Tomorrow's Powerhouse, FORTUNE, Aug. 15, 1988, at 74. The
U.S. personal savings rate in 1987 of three and a half percent was dwarfed by Japan's 16
percent. Karmin, A Silver Lining, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 1, 1988 at 48.
56. The countervailing duty law is set forth in Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677h (1982 & Supp. VI 1986).
57. BHAGWATI, at 48.
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Subsidies do distort trade, and they can do so to the detriment of un-
subsidized traders. But almost any governmental activity amounts to a
subsidy, indirect if not direct. Are we really ready to do without govern-
ment? Until we are, there is little benefit in railing against subsidies and
ending the discussion at that point. Governments, Professor Bhagwati
notes, have legitimate social objectives.58 When they support these objec-
tives, they may engage in indirect subsidization. This should not be the
end of the analysis, however. It should be the beginning.
The issue of indirect - or domestic - subsidization is indeed com-
plex. Domestic subsidies and export subsidies are the two kinds recog-
nized by the countervailing duty law.59 Export subsidies, as their name
implies, are those that are conferred because of the export of merchan-
dise. Domestic subsidies confer a benefit upon an industry regardless of
its export performance. Most agricultural production subsidies fall into
this group, as do those designed to aid depressed regions. 60 The rationale
for countervailing the benefits conferred by these programs is that they
cause an increase in production beyond what it would be in their absence,
thereby creating or adding to an export surplus. Any goods produced
with the benefit of these programs, the reasoning goes, whether exported
or sold domestically, benefit from these subsidies. All of this may be
true, but it hardly justifies wholesale condemnation of domestic subsidies
as "unfair." After all, even the 1987 U.S. proposal to end all agricultural
subsidies by the year 2000 included an exception for "a safety net against
natural disaster. ' 61 A year later, when severe drought struck American
farmers and disaster relief was provided, 62 this exception seemed pre-
scient rather than unfair.
The case for export subsidies is, perhaps, more 'difficult to make.
These are not justified by such lofty goals as disaster relief. They share
58. BHAGWATI, at 126-27.
59. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(5)(A), 1677(5)(B).
60. For examples of domestic subsidies found to be unfair, see Final Affirmative Counter-
vailing Duty Determination; Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From the Netherlands, 52 Fed. Reg.
3301 (1987) (provision of natural gas at preferred rates aids creation of cooperatives); Final
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Live Swine and Fresh, Chilled and Frozen
Pork Products From Canada, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,097 (1985)(hog price stabilization payments);
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty Order; Lamb
Meat From New Zealand, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,708 (1985)(Ioan and grant schemes for New Zea-
land producers); Wool From Argentina; Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination
and Countervailing Duty Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 14,423 (1983)(incentives for exports leaving
from southern ports).
61. United States Proposal for Negotiations on Agriculture, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 884,
885 (1987).
62. Drought Assistance Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-387, 102 Stat. 924 (1988). Prelimi-
nary estimates of the cost of the subsidy were "just under $4 billion." 134 CONG. REc.
S1,028 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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with dumping the condemnation of a Senate committee as "perni-
cious." s63 But even here the matter is not without ironies. As Professor
Bhagwati notes, largely at U.S. insistence one of the major exceptions to
the overall rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
was made for agricultureA4 In 1955, the United States obtained a waiver
that exempted its agricultural programs entirely from GATT's disci-
pline.65 And even the 1979 U.S.-engineered GATT Subsidies Code per-
mits export subsidies on "primary products," i.e., agricultural
products.66 A double standard also appears to be at work here.
II
Professor Bhagwati attributes both the protectionist sentiment behind
the capture of the trade laws and the search for "fairness" to the "dimin-
ished giant syndrome" of the United States as its economic dominance
recedes relative to other nations.67 He draws a striking parallel to nine-
teenth-century Britain where the syndrome also coupled a protectionist
backlash with demands for fairness. The advocacy of "fair" trade, he
observes, "is more reflective of the psychological mood of a nation losing
hegemony in the world economy."' 68 Professor Bhagwati sees disturbing
signs of a weakened U.S. commitment to multilateralism in trade that is
fueled in part by the "fairness" ideology that flows from the diminished
giant syndrome. Even the harnessing of export interests to stave off pro-
tectionism has its price, he notes, in the form of provoking bilateral mar-
ket-opening confrontations where the fairness issue reappears.69
But Professor Bhagwati sees some positive signs as well. The growth
of direct foreign investment both in the United States and elsewhere, he
argues, has created increasingly important pro-trade interests. More-
over, the success of Asia's newly industrialized countries, with their bias
toward trade liberalization, is conquering the ideology of import substi-
tution that has been the mainstay of the trade regimes of most developing
63. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1980). •
64. BHAGWATI, at 9 (citing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature
October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]).
65. Id.
66. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, arts. 9, 10, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S.
No. 9619, [hereinafter Interpretation Agreement] reprinted in AGREEMENTS REACHED IN
THE TOKYO ROUND OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt.
1, 259-306 (1980) (relating to subsidies and countervailing measures) [hereinafter TOKYO
ROUND AGREEMENTS]; 26 GATT BAsIc INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 56
(1980).
67. BHAGWAT, at 65.
68. Id. at 68.
69. Id. at 82.
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countries. In this regard, he notes particularly the "compelling contrast"
between the trade-liberalizing system of Korea and the protectionist sys-
tem of India, and contends that examples such as these are reducing the
attractiveness of protectionism. 70
If trade liberalization eventually is to win-out over protectionism, in-
stitutional reform is necessary. In Professor Bhagwati's words, "the pro-
protectionism bias of the current institutions needs to be corrected." 71
He devotes his final chapter to a discussion of this subject; it is a percep-
tive discussion.
The first reform he advocates is the recapture of the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws from the protectionists. One remedy Professor
Bhagwati suggests is the imposition of penalties for frivolous com-
plaints.72 One problem with this reform is that - given the existing bias
of the laws - few complaints really are frivolous. They just appear so to
any rational, fair-minded person. More important would be the elimina-
tion of the double standard in the treatment of foreign and domestic sup-
pliers, so that action is taken only against those practices which indeed
are "pernicious" and "predatory."
Professor Bhagwati suggests that referral of such complaints to inter-
national tribunals would lead to greater impartiality in the administra-
tion of the laws.73 The idea is intriguing, and perhaps not as utopian as it
at first sounds. The bilateral appeals panel established by the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement is a small step in this direction.74
Perhaps the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices established by the
GATT Antidumping Code75 and the Committee of Signatories to the
Subsidies Code76 provide an institutional base on which to build. Care
would have to be taken, however, lest the substantive law administered
by these tribunals become protectionist and defeat the benefits of an in-
ternational tribunal. The U.S. trade laws are not the only ones that have
been captured by the protectionists.77 We could end, if not careful, with
an international tribunal fairly administering an unfair law.
70. Id. at 93.
71. Id. at 115.
72. Id. at 116.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 31.
75. See TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS, supra note 66, at 307-09 (relating to antidumping
measures); 26 GATT BAsIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 171 (1980).
76. See Interpretation Agreement, supra note 66, at art. XVI.
77. An experienced Brussels practitioner has observed:
The European Community's enforcement of its anti-dumping rules is an example of hid-
den protectionism which deserves to be exposed. In the eyes of the public the "dumper"
is seen as a quasi "white collar criminal" who must be punished. Yet, with the methodol-
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Professor Bhagwati also would reform the current procedures for safe-
guard actions, institutionalize the consumer issue in trade, and provide
for "repayment to the exchequer of the social costs incurred by protec-
tion" in those cases where it has benefited industry.78 The billions of
dollars that went to the U.S. automobile industry as a result of the "vol-
untary" export restraints on Japanese cars during the 1980s, under Pro-
fessor Bhagwati's policy, would have gone to the U.S. Treasury and not
to giant bonuses for industry executives.
Professor Bhagwati's suggested improvement in the safeguard mecha-
nism is a particularly sound one. The safeguard provisions, authorized
by Article XIX of the GATT 79 and embodied in Section 201 of the Trade
Act of 1974,80 authorize increased import restraints for the protection of
an injured domestic industry without a showing of "unfairness" by the
exporters. Safeguard actions have been comparatively few because the
biased rules of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws have made
relief under those statutes fairly easy to obtain. These duties are not con-
sidered "protectionist," but merely remedies for "unfairness." Conse-
quently, antidumping and countervailing duties can be imposed by
governments without adverse international consequences. Under the
safeguard law, on the other hand, the "unfairness" justification is lack-
ing; accordingly, international rules require that governments compen-
sate their trading partners for protective safeguard actions.8 U.S. law in
turn requires approval by the President before safeguard relief can be
granted, 82 making it more difficult to obtain; by contrast the President
has no role in antidumping and countervailing duty determinations.
This compensation requirement hinges totally on the distinction of
"fairness," which is essentially meaningless because of the capture of the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws. An important international
institutional reform of the safeguard provision could begin with modifica-
tion of the GATT compensation requirement. This could be done in
conjunction with one of Professor Bhagwati's most important domestic
institutional reform recommendations--effective adjustment assistance.
If governments are to resist protectionist pressures, they will need ef-
fective institutional mechanisms to ease the consequences on workers,
ogy currently followed by the Commission, even a prudent foreign exporter cannot avoid
becoming the victim of a dumping finding.
Van Bael, Creeping Protectionism, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L., Dec. 1987, at 5-6.
78. BHAGWATI, at 117.
79. See GATT, supra note 64, at art. XIX.
80. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982).
81. See GATT, supra note 64, at art. XIX, paras. 2, 3.
82. 19 U.S.C. § 2252.
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firms and communities of the changes wrought by a more open and inte-
grated world economy. Professor Bhagwati sees the need for adjustment
assistance as critical; he is not impressed with traditional arguments that
adjustment assistance is inefficient, and that since all change requires ad-
justment, there is no reason to favor those impacted by imports over
others.8 3 Here his realism once again is apparent. The traditional objec-
tion to adjustment assistance for import-related problems
is valid in a cosmopolitan world that does not differentiate between foreign
and domestic communities. However, in the real world the refusal to ac-
cept change - and hence the need to accommodate to it and facilitate it
through adjustment assistance - is greater when the source of the distur-
bance is presumed to be foreign. If you import cheap steel and I lose my
job in Pennsylvania, that is not quite the same as if I lose my job because
you build a steel mill in California; it leads to greater resentment and more
resistance to change.8
4
Safeguard protection, in Professor Bhagwati's scheme, would be pro-
vided only as increased tariffs, not as quotas, and the proceeds of the
increased tariffs would be used to fund the adjustment assistance. The
tariff increase would decline over a specified period as adjustment took
place.85
Here is where GATT reform could contribute to the success of Profes-
sor Bhagwati's adjustment program. If Article XIX's compensation re-
quirements were suspended during the period of adjustment,
implementation of this adjustment package would be facilitated. This
modification of Article XIX, in conjunction with Professor Bhagwati's
adjustment program, would be well worth its apparent derogation of
GATT, for it could aid in the retaking of the trade laws, whose capture is
the real derogation of GATT.86
Professor Bhagwati's survey of what is wrong with the world trading
system, and what can be done to correct it, is impressive. The pith and
penetration of his insights into the protectionist nuances of the system
are particularly impressive. Despite it all, he remains optimistic, citing
what he calls the "Dracula Effect: exposing evil to sunlight helps to de-
83. BHAGWATI, at 118-19.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 119.
86. In the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Congress has taken a step in
this direction. Section 1428 of the law directs the President to attempt to negotiate changes in
the GATT to permit any country to impose a uniform "fee" of noi more than 0.15 percent on
imports in order to fund adjustment assistance. See Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1254
(1988). While this change in GATT, if agreed to, might fund adjustment assistance, it does
not address the issue of compensation for tariff increases.
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stroy it.' 87 In this book, Professor Bhagwati has indeed exposed evil to
much sunlight. He also has sharpened considerably the point of the
stake that may one day be driven into the vampire's protectionist heart.
87. BHAGWATI, at 85.
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